VOID MANTICORE is a threat group assessed to operate on behalf of Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS).1 Active since at least mid-2022, VOID MANTICORE has targeted government entities, critical infrastructure, and private sector organizations across Albania, Israel, and the United States.23 VOID MANTICORE conducts destructive cyber operations, combining wiper attacks with hack-and-leak campaigns. The group has operated under multiple public-facing personas, including HomeLand Justice in operations against Albania, Karma and Karma Below in campaigns targeting Israeli organizations, and Handala Hack, its current primary persona, which has claimed activity against Israeli and U.S. entities, including a March 2026 attack against Stryker Corporation.45 VOID MANTICORE has been observed collaborating with Scarred Manticore, which has been linked to initial access operations preceding VOID MANTICORE’s activity.6
- Check Point VOID MANTICORE Handala Hack March 2026
- Check Point VOID MANTICORE Handala Hack March 2026
- Palo Alto VOID MANTICORE Iran Cyber Threats March 2026
- Check Point VOID MANTICORE Handala Hack March 2026
- DOJ FBI Handala Hack March 2026
- Domain Tools Handala Hack Karma Homeland Justice MOIS April 2026
Claims and citations
Every claim comes from a writer; provenance is the writer's assertion, not a review verdict from this directory. Validity reads by citation year.
| predicate | object | Valid | Conf. | Evidence |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| uses_technique | tech_t1113 | 2026 → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| uses_technique | tech_t1110.001 | 2026 → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| uses_technique | tech_t1119 | 2026 → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| uses_technique | tech_t1561.001 | 2026 → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| uses_technique | tech_t1486 | 2026 → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| uses_technique | tech_t1566 | 2026 → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| uses_technique | tech_t1589 | 2026 → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| uses_technique | tech_t1657 | 2026 → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| uses_technique | tech_t1102 | 2026 → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| uses_technique | tech_t1059.001 | 2026 → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| uses_technique | tech_t1047 | 2026 → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| uses_technique | tech_t1484.001 | 2026 → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| uses_technique | tech_t1564.003 | 2026 → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| uses_technique | tech_t1583.001 | 2026 → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| uses_technique | tech_t1123 | 2026 → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| uses_technique | tech_t1190 | 2026 → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| uses_technique | tech_t1114.002 | 2026 → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| uses_technique | tech_t1074 | 2026 → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| uses_technique | tech_t1078.002 | 2026 → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| uses_technique | tech_t1027.015 | 2026 → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| uses_technique | tech_t1684.001 | 2026 → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| uses_technique | tech_t1036.005 | 2026 → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| uses_technique | tech_t1679 | 2026 → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| uses_technique | tech_t1087.002 | 2026 → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| uses_technique | tech_t1588.001 | 2026 → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| uses_technique | tech_t1490 | 2026 → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| uses_technique | tech_t1072 | 2026 → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| uses_technique | tech_t1003.001 | 2026 → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| uses_technique | tech_t1651 | 2026 → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| uses_technique | tech_t1583.003 | 2026 → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| uses_technique | tech_t1583.006 | 2026 → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| uses_technique | tech_t1686.003 | 2026 → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| uses_technique | tech_t1552.002 | 2026 → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| uses_technique | tech_t1213.002 | 2026 → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| uses_technique | tech_t1219.002 | 2026 → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| uses_technique | tech_t1595.002 | 2026 → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| uses_technique | tech_t1561.002 | 2026 → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| uses_technique | tech_t1583.004 | 2026 → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| uses_technique | tech_t1105 | 2026 → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| uses_technique | tech_t1082 | 2026 → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| uses_technique | tech_t1078.004 | 2026 → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| uses_technique | tech_t1133 | 2026 → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| uses_technique | tech_t1588.002 | 2026 → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| uses_technique | tech_t1547.001 | 2026 → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| uses_technique | tech_t1204.002 | 2026 → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| uses_technique | tech_t1005 | 2026 → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| uses_technique | tech_t1098 | 2026 → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| uses_technique | tech_t1125 | 2026 → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| uses_technique | tech_t1572 | 2026 → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| uses_technique | tech_t1587.001 | 2026 → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| uses_technique | tech_t1585.002 | 2026 → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| uses_technique | tech_t1071.001 | 2026 → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| uses_technique | tech_t1199 | 2026 → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| uses_technique | tech_t1110.004 | 2026 → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| uses_technique | tech_t1585.001 | 2026 → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| uses_technique | tech_t1485 | 2026 → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| uses_technique | tech_t1078 | 2026 → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| uses_technique | tech_t1110 | 2026 → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| uses_technique | tech_t1036.004 | 2026 → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| uses_technique | tech_t1059.006 | 2026 → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| uses_technique | tech_t1560.001 | 2026 → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| uses_technique | tech_t1041 | 2026 → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| uses_technique | tech_t1021.001 | 2026 → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
Technique use
| ATT&CK | Technique | platforms |
|---|---|---|
| T1003.001 | LSASS Memory | — |
| T1005 | Data from Local System | — |
| T1021.001 | Remote Desktop Protocol | — |
| T1027.015 | Compression | — |
| T1036.004 | Masquerade Task or Service | — |
| T1036.005 | Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location | — |
| T1041 | Exfiltration Over C2 Channel | — |
| T1047 | Windows Management Instrumentation | — |
| T1059.001 | PowerShell | — |
| T1059.006 | Python | — |
| T1071.001 | Web Protocols | — |
| T1072 | Software Deployment Tools | — |
| T1074 | Data Staged | — |
| T1078 | Valid Accounts | — |
| T1078.002 | Domain Accounts | — |
| T1078.004 | Cloud Accounts | — |
| T1082 | System Information Discovery | — |
| T1087.002 | Domain Account | — |
| T1098 | Account Manipulation | — |
| T1102 | Web Service | — |
| T1105 | Ingress Tool Transfer | — |
| T1110 | Brute Force | — |
| T1110.001 | Password Guessing | — |
| T1110.004 | Credential Stuffing | — |
| T1113 | Screen Capture | — |
| T1114.002 | Remote Email Collection | — |
| T1119 | Automated Collection | — |
| T1123 | Audio Capture | — |
| T1125 | Video Capture | — |
| T1133 | External Remote Services | — |
| T1190 | Exploit Public-Facing Application | — |
| T1199 | Trusted Relationship | — |
| T1204.002 | Malicious File | — |
| T1213.002 | Sharepoint | — |
| T1219.002 | Remote Desktop Software | — |
| T1484.001 | Group Policy Modification | — |
| T1485 | Data Destruction | — |
| T1486 | Data Encrypted for Impact | — |
| T1490 | Inhibit System Recovery | — |
| T1547.001 | Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder | — |
| T1552.002 | Credentials in Registry | — |
| T1560.001 | Archive via Utility | — |
| T1561.001 | Disk Content Wipe | — |
| T1561.002 | Disk Structure Wipe | — |
| T1564.003 | Hidden Window | — |
| T1566 | Phishing | — |
| T1572 | Protocol Tunneling | — |
| T1583.001 | Domains | — |
| T1583.003 | Virtual Private Server | — |
| T1583.004 | Server | — |
| T1583.006 | Web Services | — |
| T1585.001 | Social Media Accounts | — |
| T1585.002 | Email Accounts | — |
| T1587.001 | Malware | — |
| T1588.001 | Malware | — |
| T1588.002 | Tool | — |
| T1589 | Gather Victim Identity Information | — |
| T1595.002 | Vulnerability Scanning | — |
| T1651 | Cloud Administration Command | — |
| T1657 | Financial Theft | — |
| T1679 | Selective Exclusion | — |
| T1684.001 | Impersonation | — |
| T1686.003 | Windows Host Firewall | — |
Aliases
BANISHED KITTEN · COBALT MYSTIQUE · Handala Hack · Homeland Justice · Karma · Karmabelow80 · Red Sandstorm · VOID MANTICORE
Reading and review
Records are auto-ingested and not human-reviewed. Confidence is the writer's 0–100 value; bands split at ≥80 / 50–79 / <50 into high / medium / low. The four trust axes (synthetic, lifecycle, band, source count) stay separate and never merge into one score.