Automation · API / MCP 中文

Technique note · T1204.002

Malicious File

An adversary may rely upon a user opening a malicious file in order to gain execution. Users may be subjected to social engineering to get them to open a file that will lead to code execution. This user action will typically be observed as follow-on behavior from Spearphishing Attachment. Adversaries may use several types of files that require a user to execute them, including .doc, .pdf, .xls, .rtf, .scr, .exe, .lnk, .pif, .cpl, .reg, and .iso. Adversaries may employ various forms of Masquerading and Obfuscated Files or Information to increase the likelihood that a user will open and successfully execute a malicious file. These methods may include using a familiar naming convention and/or password protecting the file and supplying instructions to a user on how to open it. While Malicious File frequently occurs shortly after Initial Access it may occur at other phases of an intrusion, such as when an adversary places a file in a shared directory or on a user's desktop hoping that a user will click on it. This activity may also be seen shortly after Internal Spearphishing.

ATT&CK T1204.002 platforms — Status Active Version 20.1

An adversary may rely upon a user opening a malicious file in order to gain execution. Users may be subjected to social engineering to get them to open a file that will lead to code execution. This user action will typically be observed as follow-on behavior from Spearphishing Attachment. Adversaries may use several types of files that require a user to execute them, including .doc, .pdf, .xls, .rtf, .scr, .exe, .lnk, .pif, .cpl, .reg, and .iso.1 Adversaries may employ various forms of Masquerading and Obfuscated Files or Information to increase the likelihood that a user will open and successfully execute a malicious file. These methods may include using a familiar naming convention and/or password protecting the file and supplying instructions to a user on how to open it.2 While Malicious File frequently occurs shortly after Initial Access it may occur at other phases of an intrusion, such as when an adversary places a file in a shared directory or on a user's desktop hoping that a user will click on it. This activity may also be seen shortly after Internal Spearphishing.

  1. Mandiant Trojanized Windows 10
  2. Password Protected Word Docs

Groups using this technique

GroupNameCountry
grp_g0005APT12—
grp_g0048RTM—
grp_g0107Whitefly—
grp_g1007Aoqin DragonChina
grp_g0134Transparent TribePakistan
grp_g0013APT30—
grp_g0062TA459—
grp_g0103Mofang—
grp_g0100Inception—
grp_g0095Machete—
grp_g0019Naikon—
grp_g1011EXOTIC LILY—
grp_g1018TA2541—
grp_g0021Molerats—
grp_g0056PROMETHIUM—
grp_g0085FIN4—
grp_g0012DarkhotelSouth Korea
grp_g0137Ferocious Kitten—
grp_g0090WIRTE—
grp_g0075Rancor—
grp_g1008SideCopyPakistan
grp_g0070Dark Caracal—
grp_g1054MirrorFace—
grp_g0138AndarielDPRK
grp_g0130Ajax Security Team—
grp_g1031Saint BearRussia
grp_g0127TA551—
grp_g0089The White Company—
grp_g0068PLATINUM—
grp_g0129Mustang PandaChina
grp_g0032Lazarus GroupDPRK
grp_g0078Gorgon Group—
grp_g1001HEXANE—
grp_g1026Malteiro—
grp_g0064APT33Iran
grp_g0142Confucius—
grp_g0112Windshift—
grp_g0119Indrik SpiderRussia
grp_g0037FIN6—
grp_g0066ElderwoodChina
grp_g0080Cobalt Group—
grp_g0126Higaisa—
grp_g0035DragonflyRussia
grp_g1039RedCurlRussia
grp_g0084Gallmaker—
grp_g0131Tonto TeamChina
grp_g0102Wizard SpiderRussia
grp_g0018admin@338China
grp_g0049OilRigIran
grp_g1036Moonstone SleetDPRK
grp_g1052Contagious Interview—
grp_g0069MuddyWater—
grp_g1012CURIUMIran
grp_g1055VOID MANTICORE—
grp_g0133Nomadic OctopusRussia
grp_g0067APT37DPRK
grp_g0079DarkHydrus—
grp_g0061FIN8—
grp_g0073APT19China
grp_g1033Star Blizzard—
grp_g0082APT38DPRK
grp_g0081Tropic Trooper—
grp_g0091Silence—
grp_g1059NIMBUS MANTICORE—
grp_g1046Storm-1811—
grp_g0065LeviathanChina
grp_g0046FIN7—
grp_g0087APT39—
grp_g0099APT-C-36—
grp_g0047Gamaredon GroupRussia
grp_g0136IndigoZebraChina
grp_g0092TA505—
grp_g0094KimsukyDPRK
grp_g0059Magic HoundIran
grp_g0060BRONZE BUTLER—
grp_g0098BlackTechChina
grp_g0140LazyScripter—
grp_g0045menuPass—
grp_g1006Earth LuscaChina
grp_g0007APT28Russia
grp_g0016APT29Russia
grp_g0040Patchwork—
grp_g0121SidewinderIndia
grp_g0027Threat Group-3390China
grp_g0034Sandworm TeamRussia
grp_g0050APT32Vietnam
grp_g1002BITTERPakistan

Claims

No public claim points at this technique yet.

Auto-ingested and not human-reviewed; confidence and validity read by citation.