Automation · API / MCP 中文

Technique note · T1003.001

LSASS Memory

Adversaries may attempt to access credential material stored in the process memory of the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS). After a user logs on, the system generates and stores a variety of credential materials in LSASS process memory. These credential materials can be harvested by an administrative user or SYSTEM and used to conduct Lateral Movement using Use Alternate Authentication Material. As well as in-memory techniques, the LSASS process memory can be dumped from the target host and analyzed on a local system. For example, on the target host use procdump: * <code>procdump -ma lsass.exe lsass_dump</code> Locally, mimikatz can be run using: * <code>sekurlsa::Minidump lsassdump.dmp</code> * <code>sekurlsa::logonPasswords</code> Built-in Windows tools such as `comsvcs.dll` can also be used: * <code>rundll32.exe C:\Windows\System32\comsvcs.dll MiniDump PID lsass.dmp full</code> Similar to Image File Execution Options Injection, the silent process exit mechanism can be abused to create a memory dump of `lsass.exe` through Windows Error Reporting (`WerFault.exe`). Windows Security Support Provider (SSP) DLLs are loaded into LSASS process at system start. Once loaded into the LSA, SSP DLLs have access to encrypted and plaintext passwords that are stored in Windows, such as any logged-on user's Domain password or smart card PINs. The SSP configuration is stored in two Registry keys: <code>HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\Security Packages</code> and <code>HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\OSConfig\Security Packages</code>. An adversary may modify these Registry keys to add new SSPs, which will be loaded the next time the system boots, or when the AddSecurityPackage Windows API function is called. The following SSPs can be used to access credentials: * Msv: Interactive logons, batch logons, and service logons are done through the MSV authentication package. * Wdigest: The Digest Authentication protocol is designed for use with Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) and Simple Authentication Security Layer (SASL) exchanges. * Kerberos: Preferred for mutual client-server domain authentication in Windows 2000 and later. * CredSSP: Provides SSO and Network Level Authentication for Remote Desktop Services.

ATT&CK T1003.001 platforms — Status Active Version 20.1

Adversaries may attempt to access credential material stored in the process memory of the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS). After a user logs on, the system generates and stores a variety of credential materials in LSASS process memory. These credential materials can be harvested by an administrative user or SYSTEM and used to conduct Lateral Movement using Use Alternate Authentication Material. As well as in-memory techniques, the LSASS process memory can be dumped from the target host and analyzed on a local system. For example, on the target host use procdump: * <code>procdump -ma lsass.exe lsass_dump</code> Locally, mimikatz can be run using: * <code>sekurlsa::Minidump lsassdump.dmp</code> * <code>sekurlsa::logonPasswords</code> Built-in Windows tools such as `comsvcs.dll` can also be used: * <code>rundll32.exe C:\Windows\System32\comsvcs.dll MiniDump PID lsass.dmp full</code>12 Similar to Image File Execution Options Injection, the silent process exit mechanism can be abused to create a memory dump of `lsass.exe` through Windows Error Reporting (`WerFault.exe`).3 Windows Security Support Provider (SSP) DLLs are loaded into LSASS process at system start. Once loaded into the LSA, SSP DLLs have access to encrypted and plaintext passwords that are stored in Windows, such as any logged-on user's Domain password or smart card PINs. The SSP configuration is stored in two Registry keys: <code>HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\Security Packages</code> and <code>HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\OSConfig\Security Packages</code>. An adversary may modify these Registry keys to add new SSPs, which will be loaded the next time the system boots, or when the AddSecurityPackage Windows API function is called.4 The following SSPs can be used to access credentials: * Msv: Interactive logons, batch logons, and service logons are done through the MSV authentication package. * Wdigest: The Digest Authentication protocol is designed for use with Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) and Simple Authentication Security Layer (SASL) exchanges.5 * Kerberos: Preferred for mutual client-server domain authentication in Windows 2000 and later. * CredSSP: Provides SSO and Network Level Authentication for Remote Desktop Services.6

  1. Volexity Exchange Marauder March 2021
  2. Symantec Attacks Against Government Sector
  3. Deep Instinct LSASS
  4. Graeber 2014
  5. TechNet Blogs Credential Protection
  6. TechNet Blogs Credential Protection

Groups using this technique

GroupNameCountry
grp_g0003CleaverIran
grp_g0107Whitefly—
grp_g1030AgriusIran
grp_g1054MirrorFace—
grp_g0117Fox Kitten—
grp_g0108Blue Mockingbird—
grp_g1023APT5China
grp_g0068PLATINUM—
grp_g0143Aquatic PandaChina
grp_g0129Mustang PandaChina
grp_g0064APT33Iran
grp_g0119Indrik SpiderRussia
grp_g0093GALLIUM—
grp_g0004Ke3chang—
grp_g0037FIN6—
grp_g0077LeafminerIran
grp_g1051Medusa Group—
grp_g1048UNC3886—
grp_g1039RedCurlRussia
grp_g0102Wizard SpiderRussia
grp_g1040Play—
grp_g0049OilRigIran
grp_g1036Moonstone SleetDPRK
grp_g0006APT1China
grp_g0069MuddyWater—
grp_g1055VOID MANTICORE—
grp_g0061FIN8—
grp_g1017Volt Typhoon—
grp_g0091Silence—
grp_g0065LeviathanChina
grp_g0087APT39—
grp_g0022APT3China
grp_g0125HAFNIUM—
grp_g0094KimsukyDPRK
grp_g0059Magic HoundIran
grp_g1016FIN13—
grp_g0060BRONZE BUTLER—
grp_g1003Ember BearRussia
grp_g0096APT41China
grp_g1006Earth LuscaChina
grp_g0007APT28Russia
grp_g0027Threat Group-3390China
grp_g0034Sandworm TeamRussia
grp_g0050APT32Vietnam

Claims

No public claim points at this technique yet.

Auto-ingested and not human-reviewed; confidence and validity read by citation.