VOID MANTICORE is a threat group assessed to operate on behalf of Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS).1 Active since at least mid-2022, VOID MANTICORE has targeted government entities, critical infrastructure, and private sector organizations across Albania, Israel, and the United States.23 VOID MANTICORE conducts destructive cyber operations, combining wiper attacks with hack-and-leak campaigns. The group has operated under multiple public-facing personas, including HomeLand Justice in operations against Albania, Karma and Karma Below in campaigns targeting Israeli organizations, and Handala Hack, its current primary persona, which has claimed activity against Israeli and U.S. entities, including a March 2026 attack against Stryker Corporation.45 VOID MANTICORE has been observed collaborating with Scarred Manticore, which has been linked to initial access operations preceding VOID MANTICORE’s activity.6
- Check Point VOID MANTICORE Handala Hack March 2026
- Check Point VOID MANTICORE Handala Hack March 2026
- Palo Alto VOID MANTICORE Iran Cyber Threats March 2026
- Check Point VOID MANTICORE Handala Hack March 2026
- DOJ FBI Handala Hack March 2026
- Domain Tools Handala Hack Karma Homeland Justice MOIS April 2026
断言与引用
每条断言来自写入方;provenance 是写入方声称,不是本目录的复核结论。有效期按引用年份读取。
| predicate | object | 有效期 | 置信 | 证据 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| also_known_as | VOID MANTICORE | — → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| also_known_as | COBALT MYSTIQUE | — → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| also_known_as | Handala Hack | — → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| also_known_as | Homeland Justice | — → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| also_known_as | Karma | — → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| also_known_as | Karmabelow80 | — → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| also_known_as | BANISHED KITTEN | — → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| also_known_as | Red Sandstorm | — → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| uses_technique | tech_t1113 | 2026 → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| uses_technique | tech_t1110.001 | 2026 → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| uses_technique | tech_t1119 | 2026 → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| uses_technique | tech_t1561.001 | 2026 → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| uses_technique | tech_t1486 | 2026 → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| uses_technique | tech_t1566 | 2026 → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| uses_technique | tech_t1589 | 2026 → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| uses_technique | tech_t1657 | 2026 → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| uses_technique | tech_t1102 | 2026 → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| uses_technique | tech_t1059.001 | 2026 → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| uses_technique | tech_t1047 | 2026 → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| uses_technique | tech_t1484.001 | 2026 → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| uses_technique | tech_t1564.003 | 2026 → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| uses_technique | tech_t1583.001 | 2026 → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| uses_technique | tech_t1123 | 2026 → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| uses_technique | tech_t1190 | 2026 → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| uses_technique | tech_t1114.002 | 2026 → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| uses_technique | tech_t1074 | 2026 → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| uses_technique | tech_t1078.002 | 2026 → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| uses_technique | tech_t1027.015 | 2026 → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| uses_technique | tech_t1684.001 | 2026 → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| uses_technique | tech_t1036.005 | 2026 → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| uses_technique | tech_t1679 | 2026 → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| uses_technique | tech_t1087.002 | 2026 → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| uses_technique | tech_t1588.001 | 2026 → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| uses_technique | tech_t1490 | 2026 → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| uses_technique | tech_t1072 | 2026 → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| uses_technique | tech_t1003.001 | 2026 → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| uses_technique | tech_t1651 | 2026 → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| uses_technique | tech_t1583.003 | 2026 → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| uses_technique | tech_t1583.006 | 2026 → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| uses_technique | tech_t1686.003 | 2026 → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| uses_technique | tech_t1552.002 | 2026 → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| uses_technique | tech_t1213.002 | 2026 → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| uses_technique | tech_t1219.002 | 2026 → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| uses_technique | tech_t1595.002 | 2026 → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| uses_technique | tech_t1561.002 | 2026 → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| uses_technique | tech_t1583.004 | 2026 → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| uses_technique | tech_t1105 | 2026 → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| uses_technique | tech_t1082 | 2026 → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| uses_technique | tech_t1078.004 | 2026 → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| uses_technique | tech_t1133 | 2026 → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| uses_technique | tech_t1588.002 | 2026 → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| uses_technique | tech_t1547.001 | 2026 → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| uses_technique | tech_t1204.002 | 2026 → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| uses_technique | tech_t1005 | 2026 → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| uses_technique | tech_t1098 | 2026 → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| uses_technique | tech_t1125 | 2026 → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| uses_technique | tech_t1572 | 2026 → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| uses_technique | tech_t1587.001 | 2026 → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| uses_technique | tech_t1585.002 | 2026 → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| uses_technique | tech_t1071.001 | 2026 → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| uses_technique | tech_t1199 | 2026 → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| uses_technique | tech_t1110.004 | 2026 → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| uses_technique | tech_t1585.001 | 2026 → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| uses_technique | tech_t1485 | 2026 → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| uses_technique | tech_t1078 | 2026 → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| uses_technique | tech_t1110 | 2026 → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| uses_technique | tech_t1036.004 | 2026 → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| uses_technique | tech_t1059.006 | 2026 → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| uses_technique | tech_t1560.001 | 2026 → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| uses_technique | tech_t1041 | 2026 → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| uses_technique | tech_t1021.001 | 2026 → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
技术使用
| ATT&CK | 技术 | platforms |
|---|---|---|
| T1003.001 | LSASS Memory | — |
| T1005 | Data from Local System | — |
| T1021.001 | Remote Desktop Protocol | — |
| T1027.015 | Compression | — |
| T1036.004 | Masquerade Task or Service | — |
| T1036.005 | Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location | — |
| T1041 | Exfiltration Over C2 Channel | — |
| T1047 | Windows Management Instrumentation | — |
| T1059.001 | PowerShell | — |
| T1059.006 | Python | — |
| T1071.001 | Web Protocols | — |
| T1072 | Software Deployment Tools | — |
| T1074 | Data Staged | — |
| T1078 | Valid Accounts | — |
| T1078.002 | Domain Accounts | — |
| T1078.004 | Cloud Accounts | — |
| T1082 | System Information Discovery | — |
| T1087.002 | Domain Account | — |
| T1098 | Account Manipulation | — |
| T1102 | Web Service | — |
| T1105 | Ingress Tool Transfer | — |
| T1110 | Brute Force | — |
| T1110.001 | Password Guessing | — |
| T1110.004 | Credential Stuffing | — |
| T1113 | Screen Capture | — |
| T1114.002 | Remote Email Collection | — |
| T1119 | Automated Collection | — |
| T1123 | Audio Capture | — |
| T1125 | Video Capture | — |
| T1133 | External Remote Services | — |
| T1190 | Exploit Public-Facing Application | — |
| T1199 | Trusted Relationship | — |
| T1204.002 | Malicious File | — |
| T1213.002 | Sharepoint | — |
| T1219.002 | Remote Desktop Software | — |
| T1484.001 | Group Policy Modification | — |
| T1485 | Data Destruction | — |
| T1486 | Data Encrypted for Impact | — |
| T1490 | Inhibit System Recovery | — |
| T1547.001 | Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder | — |
| T1552.002 | Credentials in Registry | — |
| T1560.001 | Archive via Utility | — |
| T1561.001 | Disk Content Wipe | — |
| T1561.002 | Disk Structure Wipe | — |
| T1564.003 | Hidden Window | — |
| T1566 | Phishing | — |
| T1572 | Protocol Tunneling | — |
| T1583.001 | Domains | — |
| T1583.003 | Virtual Private Server | — |
| T1583.004 | Server | — |
| T1583.006 | Web Services | — |
| T1585.001 | Social Media Accounts | — |
| T1585.002 | Email Accounts | — |
| T1587.001 | Malware | — |
| T1588.001 | Malware | — |
| T1588.002 | Tool | — |
| T1589 | Gather Victim Identity Information | — |
| T1595.002 | Vulnerability Scanning | — |
| T1651 | Cloud Administration Command | — |
| T1657 | Financial Theft | — |
| T1679 | Selective Exclusion | — |
| T1684.001 | Impersonation | — |
| T1686.003 | Windows Host Firewall | — |
别名
BANISHED KITTEN · COBALT MYSTIQUE · Handala Hack · Homeland Justice · Karma · Karmabelow80 · Red Sandstorm · VOID MANTICORE
读取与复核
记录自动入库·未人工复核。置信度是写入方给出的 0–100 值,置信带按 ≥80 / 50–79 / <50 划为高 / 中 / 低;四条信任轴(合成、生命周期、置信带、佐证源数)分开呈现,不合并为单一信任分。