Automation · API / MCP 中文

Group profile · G1051

Medusa Group

Medusa Group has been active since at least 2021 and was initially operated as a closed ransomware group before evolving into a Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) operation. Some reporting indicates that certain attacks may still be conducted directly by the ransomware’s core developers. Public sources have also referred to the group as “Spearwing” or “Medusa Actors.” Medusa Group employs living-off-the-land techniques, frequently leveraging publicly available tools and common remote management software to conduct operations. The group engages in double extortion tactics, exfiltrating data prior to encryption and threatening to publish stolen information if ransom demands are not met. For initial access, Medusa Group has exploited publicly known vulnerabilities, conducted phishing campaigns, and used credentials or access purchased from Initial Access Brokers (IABs). The group is opportunistic and has targeted a wide range of sectors globally.

ATT&CK G1051 Confidence High · 100 Source src_mitre_attck_enterprise Status active
All2025

Medusa Group has been active since at least 2021 and was initially operated as a closed ransomware group before evolving into a Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) operation. Some reporting indicates that certain attacks may still be conducted directly by the ransomware’s core developers. Public sources have also referred to the group as “Spearwing” or “Medusa Actors.” 1 2 Medusa Group employs living-off-the-land techniques, frequently leveraging publicly available tools and common remote management software to conduct operations. The group engages in double extortion tactics, exfiltrating data prior to encryption and threatening to publish stolen information if ransom demands are not met. 3 For initial access, Medusa Group has exploited publicly known vulnerabilities, conducted phishing campaigns, and used credentials or access purchased from Initial Access Brokers (IABs). The group is opportunistic and has targeted a wide range of sectors globally. 4

  1. CISA Medusa Group Medusa Ransomware March 2025
  2. Broadcom Medusa Ransomware Medusa Group March 2025
  3. Security Scorecard Medusa Ransomware January 2024
  4. Intel471 Medusa Ransomware May 2025

Claims and citations

Every claim comes from a writer; provenance is the writer's assertion, not a review verdict from this directory. Validity reads by citation year.

predicateobjectValidConf.Evidence
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Technique use

ATT&CKTechniqueplatforms
T1003.001LSASS Memory—
T1003.003NTDS—
T1016System Network Configuration Discovery—
T1018Remote System Discovery—
T1021.001Remote Desktop Protocol—
T1027.002Software Packing—
T1027.010Command Obfuscation—
T1033System Owner/User Discovery—
T1046Network Service Discovery—
T1047Windows Management Instrumentation—
T1057Process Discovery—
T1059.001PowerShell—
T1059.003Windows Command Shell—
T1069.002Domain Groups—
T1070.003Clear Command History—
T1070.004File Deletion—
T1071.001Web Protocols—
T1072Software Deployment Tools—
T1078Valid Accounts—
T1082System Information Discovery—
T1083File and Directory Discovery—
T1087.001Local Account—
T1090.003Multi-hop Proxy—
T1105Ingress Tool Transfer—
T1106Native API—
T1112Modify Registry—
T1135Network Share Discovery—
T1136.002Domain Account—
T1190Exploit Public-Facing Application—
T1218.014MMC—
T1219Remote Access Tools—
T1486Data Encrypted for Impact—
T1489Service Stop—
T1490Inhibit System Recovery—
T1505.003Web Shell—
T1518.001Security Software Discovery—
T1529System Shutdown/Reboot—
T1543.003Windows Service—
T1548.002Bypass User Account Control—
T1553.002Code Signing—
T1559.001Component Object Model—
T1564.003Hidden Window—
T1567.002Exfiltration to Cloud Storage—
T1569.002Service Execution—
T1570Lateral Tool Transfer—
T1573.002Asymmetric Cryptography—
T1583.006Web Services—
T1585.001Social Media Accounts—
T1585.002Email Accounts—
T1588.002Tool—
T1608.002Upload Tool—
T1650Acquire Access—
T1652Device Driver Discovery—
T1657Financial Theft—
T1685Disable or Modify Tools—
T1686Disable or Modify System Firewall—
T1690Prevent Command History Logging—

Aliases

Medusa Group

Reading and review

Records are auto-ingested and not human-reviewed. Confidence is the writer's 0–100 value; bands split at ≥80 / 50–79 / <50 into high / medium / low. The four trust axes (synthetic, lifecycle, band, source count) stay separate and never merge into one score.

Corrections