自动化接入 · API / MCP EN

组织档案 · G0032

Lazarus Group

Lazarus Group is a North Korean state-sponsored cyber threat group attributed to the Reconnaissance General Bureau (RGB). Lazarus Group has been active since at least 2009 and is reportedly responsible for the November 2014 destructive wiper attack on Sony Pictures Entertainment, identified by Novetta as part of Operation Blockbuster. Malware used by Lazarus Group correlates to other reported campaigns, including Operation Flame, Operation 1Mission, Operation Troy, DarkSeoul, and Ten Days of Rain. North Korea’s cyber operations have shown a consistent pattern of adaptation, forming and reorganizing units as national priorities shift. These units frequently share personnel, infrastructure, malware, and tradecraft, making it difficult to attribute specific operations with high confidence. Public reporting often uses “Lazarus Group” as an umbrella term for multiple North Korean cyber operators conducting espionage, destructive attacks, and financially motivated campaigns.

ATT&CK G0032 置信带 高 · 100 来源 src_mitre_attck_enterprise 状态 active
全部2017

当前只显示 2017 年的引用;分面页不参与索引,canonical 归组织档案。

Lazarus Group is a North Korean state-sponsored cyber threat group attributed to the Reconnaissance General Bureau (RGB). 1 2 Lazarus Group has been active since at least 2009 and is reportedly responsible for the November 2014 destructive wiper attack on Sony Pictures Entertainment, identified by Novetta as part of Operation Blockbuster. Malware used by Lazarus Group correlates to other reported campaigns, including Operation Flame, Operation 1Mission, Operation Troy, DarkSeoul, and Ten Days of Rain.3 North Korea’s cyber operations have shown a consistent pattern of adaptation, forming and reorganizing units as national priorities shift. These units frequently share personnel, infrastructure, malware, and tradecraft, making it difficult to attribute specific operations with high confidence. Public reporting often uses “Lazarus Group” as an umbrella term for multiple North Korean cyber operators conducting espionage, destructive attacks, and financially motivated campaigns.456

  1. US-CERT HIDDEN COBRA June 2017
  2. Treasury North Korean Cyber Groups September 2019
  3. Novetta Blockbuster
  4. Mandiant DPRK Laz Org Breakdown 2022
  5. Mandiant DPRK Groups 2023
  6. JPCert Blog Laz Subgroups 2025

断言与引用

每条断言来自写入方;provenance 是写入方声称,不是本目录的复核结论。有效期按引用年份读取。

predicateobject有效期置信证据
uses_techniquetech_t1059.0032017 → …100src_mitre_attck_enterprise
uses_techniquetech_t1566.0012017 → …100src_mitre_attck_enterprise
uses_techniquetech_t12022017 → …100src_mitre_attck_enterprise
uses_techniquetech_t1048.0032017 → …100src_mitre_attck_enterprise
uses_techniquetech_t1001.0032017 → …100src_mitre_attck_enterprise
uses_techniquetech_t1584.0042017 → …100src_mitre_attck_enterprise
uses_techniquetech_t11052017 → …100src_mitre_attck_enterprise
uses_techniquetech_t1218.0052017 → …100src_mitre_attck_enterprise
uses_techniquetech_t10102017 → …100src_mitre_attck_enterprise
uses_techniquetech_t1587.0012017 → …100src_mitre_attck_enterprise
uses_techniquetech_t1134.0022017 → …100src_mitre_attck_enterprise
uses_techniquetech_t1021.0042017 → …100src_mitre_attck_enterprise
uses_techniquetech_t10982017 → …100src_mitre_attck_enterprise
uses_techniquetech_t1564.0012017 → …100src_mitre_attck_enterprise
uses_techniquetech_t14852017 → …100src_mitre_attck_enterprise
uses_techniquetech_t15912017 → …100src_mitre_attck_enterprise
uses_techniquetech_t11062017 → …100src_mitre_attck_enterprise
uses_techniquetech_t10782017 → …100src_mitre_attck_enterprise
uses_techniquetech_t1027.0092017 → …100src_mitre_attck_enterprise
uses_techniquetech_t10122017 → …100src_mitre_attck_enterprise
uses_techniquetech_t1090.0022017 → …100src_mitre_attck_enterprise
uses_techniquetech_t1027.0132017 → …100src_mitre_attck_enterprise
uses_techniquetech_t11042017 → …100src_mitre_attck_enterprise
uses_techniquetech_t10462017 → …100src_mitre_attck_enterprise
uses_techniquetech_t10052017 → …100src_mitre_attck_enterprise
uses_techniquetech_t14892017 → …100src_mitre_attck_enterprise
uses_techniquetech_t10162017 → …100src_mitre_attck_enterprise
uses_techniquetech_t1588.0042017 → …100src_mitre_attck_enterprise
uses_techniquetech_t1573.0012017 → …100src_mitre_attck_enterprise
uses_techniquetech_t10822017 → …100src_mitre_attck_enterprise
uses_techniquetech_t10332017 → …100src_mitre_attck_enterprise
uses_techniquetech_t16202017 → …100src_mitre_attck_enterprise
uses_techniquetech_t10412017 → …100src_mitre_attck_enterprise
uses_techniquetech_t1102.0022017 → …100src_mitre_attck_enterprise
uses_techniquetech_t15602017 → …100src_mitre_attck_enterprise
uses_techniquetech_t12032017 → …100src_mitre_attck_enterprise
uses_techniquetech_t1059.0012017 → …100src_mitre_attck_enterprise
uses_techniquetech_t1566.0022017 → …100src_mitre_attck_enterprise
uses_techniquetech_t1074.0012017 → …100src_mitre_attck_enterprise
uses_techniquetech_t1036.0032017 → …100src_mitre_attck_enterprise
uses_techniquetech_t10472017 → …100src_mitre_attck_enterprise
uses_techniquetech_t1071.0012017 → …100src_mitre_attck_enterprise
uses_techniquetech_t1557.0012017 → …100src_mitre_attck_enterprise
uses_techniquetech_t10572017 → …100src_mitre_attck_enterprise
uses_techniquetech_t1547.0012017 → …100src_mitre_attck_enterprise
uses_techniquetech_t16852017 → …100src_mitre_attck_enterprise
uses_techniquetech_t1589.0022017 → …100src_mitre_attck_enterprise
uses_techniquetech_t1561.0012017 → …100src_mitre_attck_enterprise
uses_techniquetech_t1491.0012017 → …100src_mitre_attck_enterprise
uses_techniquetech_t1588.0022017 → …100src_mitre_attck_enterprise
uses_techniquetech_t1547.0092017 → …100src_mitre_attck_enterprise
uses_techniquetech_t1059.0052017 → …100src_mitre_attck_enterprise
uses_techniquetech_t1542.0032017 → …100src_mitre_attck_enterprise
uses_techniquetech_t1218.0112017 → …100src_mitre_attck_enterprise
uses_techniquetech_t1583.0062017 → …100src_mitre_attck_enterprise
uses_techniquetech_t1056.0012017 → …100src_mitre_attck_enterprise
uses_techniquetech_t15712017 → …100src_mitre_attck_enterprise
uses_techniquetech_t1132.0012017 → …100src_mitre_attck_enterprise
uses_techniquetech_t11892017 → …100src_mitre_attck_enterprise
uses_techniquetech_t1110.0032017 → …100src_mitre_attck_enterprise
uses_techniquetech_t1204.0022017 → …100src_mitre_attck_enterprise
uses_techniquetech_t1553.0022017 → …100src_mitre_attck_enterprise
uses_techniquetech_t12182017 → …100src_mitre_attck_enterprise
uses_techniquetech_t1560.0022017 → …100src_mitre_attck_enterprise
uses_techniquetech_t1027.0072017 → …100src_mitre_attck_enterprise
uses_techniquetech_t1070.0042017 → …100src_mitre_attck_enterprise
uses_techniquetech_t1090.0012017 → …100src_mitre_attck_enterprise
uses_techniquetech_t10082017 → …100src_mitre_attck_enterprise
uses_techniquetech_t11402017 → …100src_mitre_attck_enterprise
uses_techniquetech_t16802017 → …100src_mitre_attck_enterprise
uses_techniquetech_t1561.0022017 → …100src_mitre_attck_enterprise
uses_techniquetech_t1583.0012017 → …100src_mitre_attck_enterprise
uses_techniquetech_t1053.0052017 → …100src_mitre_attck_enterprise
uses_techniquetech_t1566.0032017 → …100src_mitre_attck_enterprise
uses_techniquetech_t1036.0052017 → …100src_mitre_attck_enterprise
uses_techniquetech_t10702017 → …100src_mitre_attck_enterprise
uses_techniquetech_t10832017 → …100src_mitre_attck_enterprise
uses_techniquetech_t1574.0132017 → …100src_mitre_attck_enterprise
uses_techniquetech_t1055.0012017 → …100src_mitre_attck_enterprise
uses_techniquetech_t1585.0012017 → …100src_mitre_attck_enterprise
uses_techniquetech_t1021.0012017 → …100src_mitre_attck_enterprise
uses_techniquetech_t15292017 → …100src_mitre_attck_enterprise
uses_techniquetech_t11242017 → …100src_mitre_attck_enterprise
uses_techniquetech_t1036.0042017 → …100src_mitre_attck_enterprise
uses_techniquetech_t1070.0062017 → …100src_mitre_attck_enterprise
uses_techniquetech_t1070.0032017 → …100src_mitre_attck_enterprise
uses_techniquetech_t1574.0012017 → …100src_mitre_attck_enterprise
uses_techniquetech_t1686.0032017 → …100src_mitre_attck_enterprise
uses_techniquetech_t1543.0032017 → …100src_mitre_attck_enterprise
uses_techniquetech_t1021.0022017 → …100src_mitre_attck_enterprise
uses_techniquetech_t1585.0022017 → …100src_mitre_attck_enterprise
uses_techniquetech_t10492017 → …100src_mitre_attck_enterprise
uses_techniquetech_t1560.0032017 → …100src_mitre_attck_enterprise

技术使用

ATT&CK技术platforms
T1001.003Protocol or Service Impersonation—
T1005Data from Local System—
T1008Fallback Channels—
T1010Application Window Discovery—
T1012Query Registry—
T1016System Network Configuration Discovery—
T1021.001Remote Desktop Protocol—
T1021.002SMB/Windows Admin Shares—
T1021.004SSH—
T1027.007Dynamic API Resolution—
T1027.009Embedded Payloads—
T1027.013Encrypted/Encoded File—
T1033System Owner/User Discovery—
T1036.003Rename Legitimate Utilities—
T1036.004Masquerade Task or Service—
T1036.005Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location—
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 Channel—
T1046Network Service Discovery—
T1047Windows Management Instrumentation—
T1048.003Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol—
T1049System Network Connections Discovery—
T1053.005Scheduled Task—
T1055.001Dynamic-link Library Injection—
T1056.001Keylogging—
T1057Process Discovery—
T1059.001PowerShell—
T1059.003Windows Command Shell—
T1059.005Visual Basic—
T1070Indicator Removal—
T1070.003Clear Command History—
T1070.004File Deletion—
T1070.006Timestomp—
T1071.001Web Protocols—
T1074.001Local Data Staging—
T1078Valid Accounts—
T1082System Information Discovery—
T1083File and Directory Discovery—
T1090.001Internal Proxy—
T1090.002External Proxy—
T1098Account Manipulation—
T1102.002Bidirectional Communication—
T1104Multi-Stage Channels—
T1105Ingress Tool Transfer—
T1106Native API—
T1110.003Password Spraying—
T1124System Time Discovery—
T1132.001Standard Encoding—
T1134.002Create Process with Token—
T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information—
T1189Drive-by Compromise—
T1202Indirect Command Execution—
T1203Exploitation for Client Execution—
T1204.002Malicious File—
T1218System Binary Proxy Execution—
T1218.005Mshta—
T1218.011Rundll32—
T1485Data Destruction—
T1489Service Stop—
T1491.001Internal Defacement—
T1529System Shutdown/Reboot—
T1542.003Bootkit—
T1543.003Windows Service—
T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder—
T1547.009Shortcut Modification—
T1553.002Code Signing—
T1557.001Name Resolution Poisoning and SMB Relay—
T1560Archive Collected Data—
T1560.002Archive via Library—
T1560.003Archive via Custom Method—
T1561.001Disk Content Wipe—
T1561.002Disk Structure Wipe—
T1564.001Hidden Files and Directories—
T1566.001Spearphishing Attachment—
T1566.002Spearphishing Link—
T1566.003Spearphishing via Service—
T1571Non-Standard Port—
T1573.001Symmetric Cryptography—
T1574.001DLL—
T1574.013KernelCallbackTable—
T1583.001Domains—
T1583.006Web Services—
T1584.004Server—
T1585.001Social Media Accounts—
T1585.002Email Accounts—
T1587.001Malware—
T1588.002Tool—
T1588.004Digital Certificates—
T1589.002Email Addresses—
T1591Gather Victim Org Information—
T1620Reflective Code Loading—
T1680Local Storage Discovery—
T1685Disable or Modify Tools—
T1686.003Windows Host Firewall—

别名

Diamond Sleet · Guardians of Peace · HIDDEN COBRA · Labyrinth Chollima · Lazarus Group · NICKEL ACADEMY · ZINC

读取与复核

记录自动入库·未人工复核。置信度是写入方给出的 0–100 值,置信带按 ≥80 / 50–79 / <50 划为高 / 中 / 低;四条信任轴(合成、生命周期、置信带、佐证源数)分开呈现,不合并为单一信任分。

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