自动化接入 · API / MCP EN

技术说明 · T1566.002

Spearphishing Link

Adversaries may send spearphishing emails with a malicious link in an attempt to gain access to victim systems. Spearphishing with a link is a specific variant of spearphishing. It is different from other forms of spearphishing in that it employs the use of links to download malware contained in email, instead of attaching malicious files to the email itself, to avoid defenses that may inspect email attachments. Spearphishing may also involve social engineering techniques, such as posing as a trusted source. All forms of spearphishing are electronically delivered social engineering targeted at a specific individual, company, or industry. In this case, the malicious emails contain links. Generally, the links will be accompanied by social engineering text and require the user to actively click or copy and paste a URL into a browser, leveraging User Execution. The visited website may compromise the web browser using an exploit, or the user will be prompted to download applications, documents, zip files, or even executables depending on the pretext for the email in the first place. Adversaries may also include links that are intended to interact directly with an email reader, including embedded images intended to exploit the end system directly. Additionally, adversaries may use seemingly benign links that abuse special characters to mimic legitimate websites (known as an "IDN homograph attack"). URLs may also be obfuscated by taking advantage of quirks in the URL schema, such as the acceptance of integer- or hexadecimal-based hostname formats and the automatic discarding of text before an “@” symbol: for example, `hxxp://google.com@1157586937`. Adversaries may also utilize links to perform consent phishing/spearphishing campaigns to Steal Application Access Tokens that grant immediate access to the victim environment. For example, a user may be lured into granting adversaries permissions/access via a malicious OAuth 2.0 request URL that when accepted by the user provides permissions/access for malicious applications. These stolen access tokens allow the adversary to perform various actions on behalf of the user via API calls. Similarly, malicious links may also target device-based authorization, such as OAuth 2.0 device authorization grant flow which is typically used to authenticate devices without UIs/browsers. Known as “device code phishing,” an adversary may send a link that directs the victim to a malicious authorization page where the user is tricked into entering a code/credentials that produces a device token.

ATT&CK T1566.002 platforms — 状态 有效 版本 20.1

Adversaries may send spearphishing emails with a malicious link in an attempt to gain access to victim systems. Spearphishing with a link is a specific variant of spearphishing. It is different from other forms of spearphishing in that it employs the use of links to download malware contained in email, instead of attaching malicious files to the email itself, to avoid defenses that may inspect email attachments. Spearphishing may also involve social engineering techniques, such as posing as a trusted source. All forms of spearphishing are electronically delivered social engineering targeted at a specific individual, company, or industry. In this case, the malicious emails contain links. Generally, the links will be accompanied by social engineering text and require the user to actively click or copy and paste a URL into a browser, leveraging User Execution. The visited website may compromise the web browser using an exploit, or the user will be prompted to download applications, documents, zip files, or even executables depending on the pretext for the email in the first place. Adversaries may also include links that are intended to interact directly with an email reader, including embedded images intended to exploit the end system directly. Additionally, adversaries may use seemingly benign links that abuse special characters to mimic legitimate websites (known as an "IDN homograph attack").1 URLs may also be obfuscated by taking advantage of quirks in the URL schema, such as the acceptance of integer- or hexadecimal-based hostname formats and the automatic discarding of text before an “@” symbol: for example, `hxxp://google.com@1157586937`.2 Adversaries may also utilize links to perform consent phishing/spearphishing campaigns to Steal Application Access Tokens that grant immediate access to the victim environment. For example, a user may be lured into granting adversaries permissions/access via a malicious OAuth 2.0 request URL that when accepted by the user provides permissions/access for malicious applications.34 These stolen access tokens allow the adversary to perform various actions on behalf of the user via API calls.5 Similarly, malicious links may also target device-based authorization, such as OAuth 2.0 device authorization grant flow which is typically used to authenticate devices without UIs/browsers. Known as “device code phishing,” an adversary may send a link that directs the victim to a malicious authorization page where the user is tricked into entering a code/credentials that produces a device token.678

  1. CISA IDN ST05-016
  2. Mandiant URL Obfuscation 2023
  3. Trend Micro Pawn Storm OAuth 2017
  4. Microsoft OAuth 2.0 Consent Phishing 2021
  5. Microsoft OAuth 2.0 Consent Phishing 2021
  6. SecureWorks Device Code Phishing 2021
  7. Netskope Device Code Phishing 2021
  8. Optiv Device Code Phishing 2021

使用该技术的组织

组织名称国家
grp_g0134Transparent TribePakistan
grp_g0103Mofang—
grp_g0095Machete—
grp_g1011EXOTIC LILY—
grp_g1018TA2541—
grp_g1037TA577—
grp_g0021Molerats—
grp_g0085FIN4—
grp_g0120Evilnum—
grp_g0090WIRTE—
grp_g1014LuminousMothChina
grp_g1054MirrorFace—
grp_g1020Mustard Tempest—
grp_g0128ZIRCONIUM—
grp_g0129Mustang PandaChina
grp_g0032Lazarus GroupDPRK
grp_g0064APT33Iran
grp_g0142Confucius—
grp_g0112Windshift—
grp_g0066ElderwoodChina
grp_g0080Cobalt Group—
grp_g1039RedCurlRussia
grp_g0102Wizard SpiderRussia
grp_g1044APT42Iran
grp_g0049OilRigIran
grp_g0006APT1China
grp_g0069MuddyWater—
grp_g0061FIN8—
grp_g0082APT38DPRK
grp_g1059NIMBUS MANTICORE—
grp_g1046Storm-1811—
grp_g0065LeviathanChina
grp_g0046FIN7—
grp_g0087APT39—
grp_g0010TurlaRussia
grp_g0099APT-C-36—
grp_g0022APT3China
grp_g0092TA505—
grp_g0094KimsukyDPRK
grp_g0059Magic HoundIran
grp_g0098BlackTechChina
grp_g0140LazyScripter—
grp_g1006Earth LuscaChina
grp_g0016APT29Russia
grp_g0040Patchwork—
grp_g0121SidewinderIndia
grp_g0034Sandworm TeamRussia
grp_g0050APT32Vietnam

断言

尚无指向该技术的公开断言。

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