APT42 is an Iranian-sponsored threat group that conducts cyber espionage and surveillance.1 The group primarily focuses on targets in the Middle East region, but has targeted a variety of industries and countries since at least 2015.2 APT42 starts cyber operations through spearphishing emails and/or the PINEFLOWER Android malware, then monitors and collects information from the compromised systems and devices.3 Finally, APT42 exfiltrates data using native features and open-source tools.4 APT42 activities have been linked to Magic Hound by other commercial vendors. While there are behavior and software overlaps between Magic Hound and APT42, they appear to be distinct entities and are tracked as separate entities by their originating vendor.
- Mandiant APT42-charms
- Mandiant APT42-charms
- Mandiant APT42-charms
- Mandiant APT42-untangling
Claims and citations
Every claim comes from a writer; provenance is the writer's assertion, not a review verdict from this directory. Validity reads by citation year.
| predicate | object | Valid | Conf. | Evidence |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| also_known_as | APT42 | — → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| uses_technique | tech_t1059.001 | 2025 → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| uses_technique | tech_t1518.001 | 2025 → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| uses_technique | tech_t1036.005 | 2025 → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| uses_technique | tech_t1070 | 2025 → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| uses_technique | tech_t1056 | 2025 → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| uses_technique | tech_t1583.001 | 2025 → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| uses_technique | tech_t1132.001 | 2025 → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| uses_technique | tech_t1530 | 2025 → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| uses_technique | tech_t1059.005 | 2025 → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| uses_technique | tech_t1697 | 2025 → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| uses_technique | tech_t1113 | 2025 → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| uses_technique | tech_t1684.001 | 2025 → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| uses_technique | tech_t1016 | 2025 → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| uses_technique | tech_t1087.001 | 2025 → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| uses_technique | tech_t1585.002 | 2025 → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| uses_technique | tech_t1053.005 | 2025 → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| uses_technique | tech_t1682 | 2025 → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| uses_technique | tech_t1070.008 | 2025 → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| uses_technique | tech_t1056.001 | 2025 → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| uses_technique | tech_t1102 | 2025 → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| uses_technique | tech_t1082 | 2025 → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| uses_technique | tech_t1071.001 | 2025 → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| uses_technique | tech_t1583.003 | 2025 → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| uses_technique | tech_t1573.002 | 2025 → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| uses_technique | tech_t1047 | 2025 → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| uses_technique | tech_t1539 | 2025 → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| uses_technique | tech_t1608.001 | 2025 → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| uses_technique | tech_t1588.002 | 2025 → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| uses_technique | tech_t1111 | 2025 → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| uses_technique | tech_t1547 | 2025 → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| uses_technique | tech_t1112 | 2025 → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| uses_technique | tech_t1566.002 | 2025 → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| uses_technique | tech_t1555.003 | 2025 → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
Technique use
| ATT&CK | Technique | platforms |
|---|---|---|
| T1016 | System Network Configuration Discovery | — |
| T1036.005 | Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location | — |
| T1047 | Windows Management Instrumentation | — |
| T1053.005 | Scheduled Task | — |
| T1056 | Input Capture | — |
| T1056.001 | Keylogging | — |
| T1059.001 | PowerShell | — |
| T1059.005 | Visual Basic | — |
| T1070 | Indicator Removal | — |
| T1070.008 | Clear Mailbox Data | — |
| T1071.001 | Web Protocols | — |
| T1082 | System Information Discovery | — |
| T1087.001 | Local Account | — |
| T1102 | Web Service | — |
| T1111 | Multi-Factor Authentication Interception | — |
| T1112 | Modify Registry | — |
| T1113 | Screen Capture | — |
| T1132.001 | Standard Encoding | — |
| T1518.001 | Security Software Discovery | — |
| T1530 | Data from Cloud Storage | — |
| T1539 | Steal Web Session Cookie | — |
| T1547 | Boot or Logon Autostart Execution | — |
| T1555.003 | Credentials from Web Browsers | — |
| T1566.002 | Spearphishing Link | — |
| T1573.002 | Asymmetric Cryptography | — |
| T1583.001 | Domains | — |
| T1583.003 | Virtual Private Server | — |
| T1585.002 | Email Accounts | — |
| T1588.002 | Tool | — |
| T1608.001 | Upload Malware | — |
| T1682 | Query Public AI Services | — |
| T1684.001 | Impersonation | — |
| T1697 | Steal Application Specific Passwords | — |
Aliases
APT42
Reading and review
Records are auto-ingested and not human-reviewed. Confidence is the writer's 0–100 value; bands split at ≥80 / 50–79 / <50 into high / medium / low. The four trust axes (synthetic, lifecycle, band, source count) stay separate and never merge into one score.