Automation · API / MCP 中文

Technique note · T1053.005

Scheduled Task

Adversaries may abuse the Windows Task Scheduler to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. There are multiple ways to access the Task Scheduler in Windows. The schtasks utility can be run directly on the command line, or the Task Scheduler can be opened through the GUI within the Administrator Tools section of the Control Panel. In some cases, adversaries have used a .NET wrapper for the Windows Task Scheduler, and alternatively, adversaries have used the Windows netapi32 library and Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to create a scheduled task. Adversaries may also utilize the Powershell Cmdlet `Invoke-CimMethod`, which leverages WMI class `PS_ScheduledTask` to create a scheduled task via an XML path. An adversary may use Windows Task Scheduler to execute programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence. The Windows Task Scheduler can also be abused to conduct remote Execution as part of Lateral Movement and/or to run a process under the context of a specified account (such as SYSTEM). Similar to System Binary Proxy Execution, adversaries have also abused the Windows Task Scheduler to potentially mask one-time execution under signed/trusted system processes. Adversaries may also create "hidden" scheduled tasks (i.e. Hide Artifacts) that may not be visible to defender tools and manual queries used to enumerate tasks. Specifically, an adversary may hide a task from `schtasks /query` and the Task Scheduler by deleting the associated Security Descriptor (SD) registry value (where deletion of this value must be completed using SYSTEM permissions). Adversaries may also employ alternate methods to hide tasks, such as altering the metadata (e.g., `Index` value) within associated registry keys.

ATT&CK T1053.005 platforms — Status Active Version 20.1

Adversaries may abuse the Windows Task Scheduler to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. There are multiple ways to access the Task Scheduler in Windows. The schtasks utility can be run directly on the command line, or the Task Scheduler can be opened through the GUI within the Administrator Tools section of the Control Panel.1 In some cases, adversaries have used a .NET wrapper for the Windows Task Scheduler, and alternatively, adversaries have used the Windows netapi32 library and Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to create a scheduled task. Adversaries may also utilize the Powershell Cmdlet `Invoke-CimMethod`, which leverages WMI class `PS_ScheduledTask` to create a scheduled task via an XML path.2 An adversary may use Windows Task Scheduler to execute programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence. The Windows Task Scheduler can also be abused to conduct remote Execution as part of Lateral Movement and/or to run a process under the context of a specified account (such as SYSTEM). Similar to System Binary Proxy Execution, adversaries have also abused the Windows Task Scheduler to potentially mask one-time execution under signed/trusted system processes.3 Adversaries may also create "hidden" scheduled tasks (i.e. Hide Artifacts) that may not be visible to defender tools and manual queries used to enumerate tasks. Specifically, an adversary may hide a task from `schtasks /query` and the Task Scheduler by deleting the associated Security Descriptor (SD) registry value (where deletion of this value must be completed using SYSTEM permissions).45 Adversaries may also employ alternate methods to hide tasks, such as altering the metadata (e.g., `Index` value) within associated registry keys.6

  1. Stack Overflow
  2. Red Canary - Atomic Red Team
  3. ProofPoint Serpent
  4. SigmaHQ
  5. Tarrask scheduled task
  6. Defending Against Scheduled Task Attacks in Windows Environments

Groups using this technique

GroupNameCountry
grp_g0051FIN10—
grp_g0095Machete—
grp_g0019Naikon—
grp_g1018TA2541—
grp_g1034Daggerfly—
grp_g0021Molerats—
grp_g1014LuminousMothChina
grp_g0075Rancor—
grp_g1043BlackByte—
grp_g0038Stealth Falcon—
grp_g0117Fox Kitten—
grp_g0108Blue Mockingbird—
grp_g1035Winter Vivern—
grp_g0129Mustang PandaChina
grp_g0032Lazarus GroupDPRK
grp_g1001HEXANE—
grp_g0064APT33Iran
grp_g0142Confucius—
grp_g0093GALLIUM—
grp_g0037FIN6—
grp_g0080Cobalt Group—
grp_g0114ChimeraChina
grp_g0126Higaisa—
grp_g0035DragonflyRussia
grp_g1039RedCurlRussia
grp_g0102Wizard SpiderRussia
grp_g1044APT42Iran
grp_g0049OilRigIran
grp_g1053Storm-0501—
grp_g1036Moonstone SleetDPRK
grp_g0069MuddyWater—
grp_g0067APT37DPRK
grp_g0061FIN8—
grp_g0082APT38DPRK
grp_g0091Silence—
grp_g1059NIMBUS MANTICORE—
grp_g0046FIN7—
grp_g0087APT39—
grp_g0099APT-C-36—
grp_g0047Gamaredon GroupRussia
grp_g0022APT3China
grp_g0094KimsukyDPRK
grp_g0059Magic HoundIran
grp_g1016FIN13—
grp_g0060BRONZE BUTLER—
grp_g1003Ember BearRussia
grp_g0096APT41China
grp_g0045menuPass—
grp_g1006Earth LuscaChina
grp_g1022ToddyCat—
grp_g0016APT29Russia
grp_g0040Patchwork—
grp_g0034Sandworm TeamRussia
grp_g0050APT32Vietnam
grp_g1002BITTERPakistan

Claims

No public claim points at this technique yet.

Auto-ingested and not human-reviewed; confidence and validity read by citation.