APT3 is a China-based threat group that researchers have attributed to China's Ministry of State Security.12 This group is responsible for the campaigns known as Operation Clandestine Fox, Operation Clandestine Wolf, and Operation Double Tap.34 As of June 2015, the group appears to have shifted from targeting primarily US victims to primarily political organizations in Hong Kong.5
- FireEye Clandestine Wolf
- Recorded Future APT3 May 2017
- FireEye Clandestine Wolf
- FireEye Operation Double Tap
- Symantec Buckeye
断言与引用
每条断言来自写入方；provenance 是写入方声称，不是本目录的复核结论。有效期按引用年份读取。
| predicate | object | 有效期 | 置信 | 证据 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| uses_technique | tech_t1053.005 | 2017 → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| uses_technique | tech_t1104 | 2017 → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| uses_technique | tech_t1110.002 | 2017 → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| uses_technique | tech_t1564.003 | 2017 → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| uses_technique | tech_t1555.003 | 2017 → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| uses_technique | tech_t1059.003 | 2017 → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| uses_technique | tech_t1016 | 2017 → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| uses_technique | tech_t1049 | 2017 → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| uses_technique | tech_t1090.002 | 2017 → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| uses_technique | tech_t1218.011 | 2017 → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| uses_technique | tech_t1027 | 2017 → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| uses_technique | tech_t1566.002 | 2017 → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| uses_technique | tech_t1098.007 | 2017 → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| uses_technique | tech_t1204.001 | 2017 → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| uses_technique | tech_t1041 | 2017 → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| uses_technique | tech_t1552.001 | 2017 → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| uses_technique | tech_t1074.001 | 2017 → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| uses_technique | tech_t1078.002 | 2017 → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| uses_technique | tech_t1005 | 2017 → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| uses_technique | tech_t1203 | 2017 → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| uses_technique | tech_t1021.002 | 2017 → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| uses_technique | tech_t1574.001 | 2017 → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| uses_technique | tech_t1087.001 | 2017 → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| uses_technique | tech_t1070.004 | 2017 → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| uses_technique | tech_t1083 | 2017 → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| uses_technique | tech_t1546.008 | 2017 → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| uses_technique | tech_t1560.001 | 2017 → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| uses_technique | tech_t1082 | 2017 → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| uses_technique | tech_t1059.001 | 2017 → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| uses_technique | tech_t1543.003 | 2017 → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| uses_technique | tech_t1003.001 | 2017 → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| uses_technique | tech_t1547.001 | 2017 → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| uses_technique | tech_t1021.001 | 2017 → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| uses_technique | tech_t1057 | 2017 → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| uses_technique | tech_t1095 | 2017 → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| uses_technique | tech_t1069 | 2017 → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| uses_technique | tech_t1018 | 2017 → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| uses_technique | tech_t1056.001 | 2017 → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| uses_technique | tech_t1036.010 | 2017 → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| uses_technique | tech_t1027.002 | 2017 → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| uses_technique | tech_t1136.001 | 2017 → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| uses_technique | tech_t1105 | 2017 → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| uses_technique | tech_t1033 | 2017 → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
| uses_technique | tech_t1027.005 | 2017 → … | 100 | src_mitre_attck_enterprise |
技术使用
| ATT&CK | 技术 | platforms |
|---|---|---|
| T1003.001 | LSASS Memory | — |
| T1005 | Data from Local System | — |
| T1016 | System Network Configuration Discovery | — |
| T1018 | Remote System Discovery | — |
| T1021.001 | Remote Desktop Protocol | — |
| T1021.002 | SMB/Windows Admin Shares | — |
| T1027 | Obfuscated Files or Information | — |
| T1027.002 | Software Packing | — |
| T1027.005 | Indicator Removal from Tools | — |
| T1033 | System Owner/User Discovery | — |
| T1036.010 | Masquerade Account Name | — |
| T1041 | Exfiltration Over C2 Channel | — |
| T1049 | System Network Connections Discovery | — |
| T1053.005 | Scheduled Task | — |
| T1056.001 | Keylogging | — |
| T1057 | Process Discovery | — |
| T1059.001 | PowerShell | — |
| T1059.003 | Windows Command Shell | — |
| T1069 | Permission Groups Discovery | — |
| T1070.004 | File Deletion | — |
| T1074.001 | Local Data Staging | — |
| T1078.002 | Domain Accounts | — |
| T1082 | System Information Discovery | — |
| T1083 | File and Directory Discovery | — |
| T1087.001 | Local Account | — |
| T1090.002 | External Proxy | — |
| T1095 | Non-Application Layer Protocol | — |
| T1098.007 | Additional Local or Domain Groups | — |
| T1104 | Multi-Stage Channels | — |
| T1105 | Ingress Tool Transfer | — |
| T1110.002 | Password Cracking | — |
| T1136.001 | Local Account | — |
| T1203 | Exploitation for Client Execution | — |
| T1204.001 | Malicious Link | — |
| T1218.011 | Rundll32 | — |
| T1543.003 | Windows Service | — |
| T1546.008 | Accessibility Features | — |
| T1547.001 | Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder | — |
| T1552.001 | Credentials In Files | — |
| T1555.003 | Credentials from Web Browsers | — |
| T1560.001 | Archive via Utility | — |
| T1564.003 | Hidden Window | — |
| T1566.002 | Spearphishing Link | — |
| T1574.001 | DLL | — |
别名
APT3 · Buckeye · Gothic Panda · Pirpi · TG-0110 · Threat Group-0110 · UPS Team
读取与复核
记录自动入库·未人工复核。置信度是写入方给出的 0–100 值，置信带按 ≥80 / 50–79 / <50 划为高 / 中 / 低；四条信任轴（合成、生命周期、置信带、佐证源数）分开呈现，不合并为单一信任分。