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Group profile · G1009

Moses Staff

Moses Staff is a suspected Iranian threat group that has primarily targeted Israeli companies since at least September 2021. Moses Staff openly stated their motivation in attacking Israeli companies is to cause damage by leaking stolen sensitive data and encrypting the victim's networks without a ransom demand. Security researchers assess Moses Staff is politically motivated, and has targeted government, finance, travel, energy, manufacturing, and utility companies outside of Israel as well, including those in Italy, India, Germany, Chile, Turkey, the UAE, and the US.

ATT&CK G1009 Confidence High · 100 Source src_mitre_attck_enterprise Status active
All2022

Showing 2022 citations only; facet pages stay out of the index and canonicalise to the profile.

Moses Staff is a suspected Iranian threat group that has primarily targeted Israeli companies since at least September 2021. Moses Staff openly stated their motivation in attacking Israeli companies is to cause damage by leaking stolen sensitive data and encrypting the victim's networks without a ransom demand.1 Security researchers assess Moses Staff is politically motivated, and has targeted government, finance, travel, energy, manufacturing, and utility companies outside of Israel as well, including those in Italy, India, Germany, Chile, Turkey, the UAE, and the US.2

  1. Checkpoint MosesStaff Nov 2021
  2. Cybereason StrifeWater Feb 2022

Claims and citations

Every claim comes from a writer; provenance is the writer's assertion, not a review verdict from this directory. Validity reads by citation year.

predicateobjectValidConf.Evidence
uses_techniquetech_t1021.0022022 → …100src_mitre_attck_enterprise
uses_techniquetech_t10162022 → …100src_mitre_attck_enterprise
uses_techniquetech_t1087.0012022 → …100src_mitre_attck_enterprise
uses_techniquetech_t1686.0032022 → …100src_mitre_attck_enterprise
uses_techniquetech_t10822022 → …100src_mitre_attck_enterprise
uses_techniquetech_t1588.0022022 → …100src_mitre_attck_enterprise
uses_techniquetech_t1505.0032022 → …100src_mitre_attck_enterprise
uses_techniquetech_t1587.0012022 → …100src_mitre_attck_enterprise
uses_techniquetech_t1553.0022022 → …100src_mitre_attck_enterprise
uses_techniquetech_t1027.0132022 → …100src_mitre_attck_enterprise
uses_techniquetech_t11052022 → …100src_mitre_attck_enterprise
uses_techniquetech_t11902022 → …100src_mitre_attck_enterprise

Technique use

ATT&CKTechniqueplatforms
T1016System Network Configuration Discovery—
T1021.002SMB/Windows Admin Shares—
T1027.013Encrypted/Encoded File—
T1082System Information Discovery—
T1087.001Local Account—
T1105Ingress Tool Transfer—
T1190Exploit Public-Facing Application—
T1505.003Web Shell—
T1553.002Code Signing—
T1587.001Malware—
T1588.002Tool—
T1686.003Windows Host Firewall—

Aliases

DEV-0500 · Marigold Sandstorm · Moses Staff

Reading and review

Records are auto-ingested and not human-reviewed. Confidence is the writer's 0–100 value; bands split at ≥80 / 50–79 / <50 into high / medium / low. The four trust axes (synthetic, lifecycle, band, source count) stay separate and never merge into one score.

Corrections