Adversaries may use an existing, legitimate external Web service to host information that points to additional command and control (C2) infrastructure. Adversaries may post content, known as a dead drop resolver, on Web services with embedded (and often obfuscated/encoded) domains or IP addresses. Once infected, victims will reach out to and be redirected by these resolvers.1 Popular websites and social media acting as a mechanism for C2 may give a significant amount of cover due to the likelihood that hosts within a network are already communicating with them prior to a compromise. Using common services, such as those offered by Google or Twitter, makes it easier for adversaries to hide in expected noise. Web service providers commonly use SSL/TLS encryption, giving adversaries an added level of protection. Use of a dead drop resolver may also protect back-end C2 infrastructure from discovery through malware binary analysis while also enabling operational resiliency (since this infrastructure may be dynamically changed).
- Dead Drop Resolver
使用该技术的组织
| 组织 | 名称 | 国家 |
|---|---|---|
| grp_g0048 | RTM | — |
| grp_g0094 | Kimsuky | DPRK |
| grp_g0060 | BRONZE BUTLER | — |
| grp_g0096 | APT41 | China |
| grp_g0106 | Rocke | — |
| grp_g0040 | Patchwork | — |
断言
尚无指向该技术的公开断言。
记录自动入库·未人工复核;置信度与有效期按引用读取。