Automation · API / MCP 中文

Technique note · T1208

Kerberoasting

Service principal names (SPNs) are used to uniquely identify each instance of a Windows service. To enable authentication, Kerberos requires that SPNs be associated with at least one service logon account (an account specifically tasked with running a service ). Adversaries possessing a valid Kerberos ticket-granting ticket (TGT) may request one or more Kerberos ticket-granting service (TGS) service tickets for any SPN from a domain controller (DC). Portions of these tickets may be encrypted with the RC4 algorithm, meaning the Kerberos 5 TGS-REP etype 23 hash of the service account associated with the SPN is used as the private key and is thus vulnerable to offline Brute Force attacks that may expose plaintext credentials. This same attack could be executed using service tickets captured from network traffic. Cracked hashes may enable Persistence, Privilege Escalation, and Lateral Movement via access to Valid Accounts.

ATT&CK T1208 platforms — Status Active Version 20.1

Service principal names (SPNs) are used to uniquely identify each instance of a Windows service. To enable authentication, Kerberos requires that SPNs be associated with at least one service logon account (an account specifically tasked with running a service 1). 2 3 4 5 Adversaries possessing a valid Kerberos ticket-granting ticket (TGT) may request one or more Kerberos ticket-granting service (TGS) service tickets for any SPN from a domain controller (DC). 6 7 Portions of these tickets may be encrypted with the RC4 algorithm, meaning the Kerberos 5 TGS-REP etype 23 hash of the service account associated with the SPN is used as the private key and is thus vulnerable to offline Brute Force attacks that may expose plaintext credentials. 8 9 10 This same attack could be executed using service tickets captured from network traffic. 11 Cracked hashes may enable Persistence, Privilege Escalation, and Lateral Movement via access to Valid Accounts. 12

  1. Microsoft Detecting Kerberoasting Feb 2018
  2. Microsoft SPN
  3. Microsoft SetSPN
  4. SANS Attacking Kerberos Nov 2014
  5. Harmj0y Kerberoast Nov 2016
  6. Empire InvokeKerberoast Oct 2016
  7. AdSecurity Cracking Kerberos Dec 2015
  8. AdSecurity Cracking Kerberos Dec 2015
  9. Empire InvokeKerberoast Oct 2016
  10. Harmj0y Kerberoast Nov 2016
  11. AdSecurity Cracking Kerberos Dec 2015
  12. SANS Attacking Kerberos Nov 2014

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