Automation · API / MCP 中文

Technique note · T1095

Non-Application Layer Protocol

Adversaries may use an OSI non-application layer protocol for communication between host and C2 server or among infected hosts within a network. The list of possible protocols is extensive. Specific examples include use of network layer protocols, such as the Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP), transport layer protocols, such as the User Datagram Protocol (UDP), session layer protocols, such as Socket Secure (SOCKS), as well as redirected/tunneled protocols, such as Serial over LAN (SOL). ICMP communication between hosts is one example. Because ICMP is part of the Internet Protocol Suite, it is required to be implemented by all IP-compatible hosts. However, it is not as commonly monitored as other Internet Protocols such as TCP or UDP and may be used by adversaries to hide communications. In ESXi environments, adversaries may leverage the Virtual Machine Communication Interface (VMCI) for communication between guest virtual machines and the ESXi host. This traffic is similar to client-server communications on traditional network sockets but is localized to the physical machine running the ESXi host, meaning it does not traverse external networks (routers, switches). This results in communications that are invisible to external monitoring and standard networking tools like tcpdump, netstat, nmap, and Wireshark. By adding a VMCI backdoor to a compromised ESXi host, adversaries may persistently regain access from any guest VM to the compromised ESXi host’s backdoor, regardless of network segmentation or firewall rules in place.

ATT&CK T1095 platforms — Status Active Version 20.1

Adversaries may use an OSI non-application layer protocol for communication between host and C2 server or among infected hosts within a network. The list of possible protocols is extensive.1 Specific examples include use of network layer protocols, such as the Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP), transport layer protocols, such as the User Datagram Protocol (UDP), session layer protocols, such as Socket Secure (SOCKS), as well as redirected/tunneled protocols, such as Serial over LAN (SOL). ICMP communication between hosts is one example.2 Because ICMP is part of the Internet Protocol Suite, it is required to be implemented by all IP-compatible hosts.3 However, it is not as commonly monitored as other Internet Protocols such as TCP or UDP and may be used by adversaries to hide communications. In ESXi environments, adversaries may leverage the Virtual Machine Communication Interface (VMCI) for communication between guest virtual machines and the ESXi host. This traffic is similar to client-server communications on traditional network sockets but is localized to the physical machine running the ESXi host, meaning it does not traverse external networks (routers, switches). This results in communications that are invisible to external monitoring and standard networking tools like tcpdump, netstat, nmap, and Wireshark. By adding a VMCI backdoor to a compromised ESXi host, adversaries may persistently regain access from any guest VM to the compromised ESXi host’s backdoor, regardless of network segmentation or firewall rules in place.4

  1. Wikipedia OSI
  2. Cisco Synful Knock Evolution
  3. Microsoft ICMP
  4. Google Cloud Threat Intelligence VMWare ESXi Zero-Day 2023

Groups using this technique

GroupNameCountry
grp_g1013Metador—
grp_g0068PLATINUM—
grp_g0129Mustang PandaChina
grp_g1045Salt Typhoon—
grp_g0135BackdoorDiplomacy—
grp_g0037FIN6—
grp_g1048UNC3886—
grp_g0047Gamaredon GroupRussia
grp_g0022APT3China
grp_g0125HAFNIUM—
grp_g1003Ember BearRussia
grp_g1022ToddyCat—
grp_g1002BITTERPakistan

Claims

No public claim points at this technique yet.

Auto-ingested and not human-reviewed; confidence and validity read by citation.